JPM, JPMorgan Chase & Co.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 13%, above 12% in 7 of 10 years). It runs at a 52% efficiency ratio, lean. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →North America is 77% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
- North America77%$139.7B
- EMEA13%$24.5B
- Asia Pacific8%$14.1B
- Latin America2%$4.2B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $96.6B | $100.7B | $108.8B | $115.7B | $120.0B | $121.6B | $128.7B | $158.1B | $177.6B | $182.4B | $182.4B |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | $46.1B | $50.1B | $55.1B | $57.2B | $54.6B | $52.3B | $66.7B | $89.3B | $92.6B | $95.4B | $97.5B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $24.7B | $24.4B | $32.5B | $36.4B | $29.1B | $48.3B | $37.7B | $49.6B | $58.5B | $57.0B | $58.9B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $6.70 | $6.83 | $9.51 | $11.28 | $9.44 | $15.97 | $12.69 | $16.84 | $20.31 | $20.51 | $21.65 |
| Return on equityROE | 10% | 10% | 13% | 14% | 10% | 16% | 13% | 15% | 17% | 16% | 16% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 12% | 12% | 16% | 17% | 13% | 20% | 16% | 18% | 20% | 18% | 19% |
| Efficiency ratioEffic. | 59% | 59% | 58% | 56% | 56% | 59% | 59% | 55% | 52% | 52% | 53% |
| DepositsDeposits | $1375.2B | $1444.0B | $1470.7B | $1562.4B | $2144.3B | $2462.3B | $2340.2B | $2400.7B | $2406.0B | $2559.3B | $2675.5B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $68.89 | $71.49 | $75.14 | $80.90 | $90.48 | $97.18 | $98.43 | $111.41 | $119.75 | $130.30 | $133.83 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $56.07 | $58.20 | $61.23 | $66.09 | $74.53 | $80.56 | $80.80 | $92.84 | $100.90 | $110.88 | $113.97 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $2.30 | $2.51 | $2.96 | $3.82 | $4.11 | $4.25 | $4.57 | $4.57 | $5.13 | $5.98 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 16%StrongNet income $57.0B ÷ equity $362.4B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Return on tangible equity 18%ExceptionalNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $52.7B − intangibles $1.3B)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 52%LeanNoninterest expense $95.6B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 8.2%AdequateEquity $362.4B ÷ assets $4424.9B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 58%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits $2559.3B ÷ assets $4424.9B
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 15%ModerateProvision for credit losses $14.2B ÷ net interest income $95.4B
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$3.6B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $310.0B on 2720M shares, a 16% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Competition JPMorganChase and its subsidiaries and affiliates operate in highly competitive environments.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Such developments could impair asset valuations, reduce market-wide liquidity, disrupt borrowers' ability to refinance, and increase default rates, especially if non-bank lenders have weaker underwriting standards, loans are less liquid, or transparency is limited.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$10.9B net cash - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“JPMorganChase is named as a defendant or is otherwise involved in many civil and governmental legal proceedings, including class actions, derivative actions and other litigation or disputes with third parties, as well as investigations and enforcement actions by U.S. and non-U.S. governmental author…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“An economic downturn or sustained changes in consumer behavior that result in shifts in consumer and business spending could also have a negative impact on certain of JPMorganChase's wholesale clients, and thereby diminish JPMorganChase's earnings from its wholesale operations.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Under these standards, a bank's risk governance framework must ensure that the bank's risk profile is easily distinguished and separate from that of its parent BHC for risk management purposes.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.